ABSTRACT

The Irrelevance of Intentions to Refer:

Demonstratives and Demonstrations

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According to Mario Gómez-Torrente in *Roads to Reference*, the reference of a demonstrative is fixed in an object by the speaker’s referential intentions (IRH). I argue that this is a mistake. First, I draw attention to a venerable alternative theory that Gómez-Torrente surprisingly overlooks: the reference is fixed in an object directly by a relation established in perceiving the object. Next I criticize IRH, arguing that it is implausible, redundant, and misleading. Finally, I present a theory of demonstrat*ions* that is like the alternative theory for demonstratives. For, though demonstrations do not determine the reference of demonstratives, they play an independent referential role which is important in explaining David Kaplan’s famous Carnap-Agnew example and many others including some of Gómez-Torrente’s.