

Petak 5.11.2021. u 12.00
Prostorija 138
Filozofski fakultet Rijeka
Sveučilišna Avenija 4
51000, Rijeka

Prof. Guido Melchior

**Department of Philosophy
University of Graz, Austria**

Rationally Irresolvable Disagreement

Abstract: The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. In this paper, I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various forms of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I investigate the prospects of applying the theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement to deep disagreement. I argue that this approach has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement, which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.

Petak 5.11.2021. u 14.00
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Filozofski fakultet Rijeka
Sveučilišna Avenija 4
51000, Rijeka

Prof. Martina Fürst

**Department of Philosophy
University of Graz, Austria**

Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice

Abstract:

Miranda Fricker's (2007) insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. According to Fricker, for hermeneutical injustice to vanish, a public concept of the target phenomenon has to be developed. I analyze the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice and provide one model of how to fill it. This model is based on taking the experiences of members of marginalized groups seriously and, thus, assigns these experiences the crucial role they deserve. First, I argue that the victims of hermeneutical injustice do possess some conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Next, I outline how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel public concept that is, in principle, graspable and deployable by everyone. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel public concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.

