



Department of Philosophy,
Faculty of Humanities and
Social Sciences in Rijeka



Croatian Society for
Analytic Philosophy
(CSAP/HDAF)

Book of Abstracts

International Symposium

Contemporary Philosophical Issues 2024

Organizers:

Program and scientific committee:

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Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka

Croatian Society for Analytic Philosophy

July 18 & 19, 2024

Rooms 401 and 402

Practical Information

Wi-Fi connection:

Network: UNIRI

Password: Uniri2019!!

CSAP conference information: <https://hdaf.ffri.hr/?p=1998>

Lunch venue:

Restaurant “Kampus” (13:00 – 14:30) (they also offer breakfast)

Address: Student Center Rijeka, Radmile Matejčić 5, 51000 Rijeka

Affordable accommodation close to the conference venue:

Student Center Rijeka, Radmile Matejčić 5, Rijeka, Tel. +385 51 584 530

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Restaurants/Pizzerias close to the conference venue:

Bistro La Scarpetta, Slavka Krautzeka 18, 51000 Rijeka (near Trsat)

Pizzeria “Pampas”, Slavka Krautzeka 49, 51000 Rijeka (near Trsat)

Pizzeria “Destino”, Ulica Martina Kontuša 47, 51000 Rijeka (Donja Vežica/Podvežica)

Konoba “Tarsa”, Strmica 10, 51000 Rijeka (near Trsat)

Restaurant “Trsatca”, Šetalište Joakima Rakovca 33, 5100 Rijeka (near Trsat)

Buffet “Na Sušaku”, Radnička ulica 21, 51000 Rijeka (near Donja Vežica/Podvežica)

Restaurant “Paris”, Šetalište Joakima Rakovca 2, 51000 Rijeka (near Trsat)

Transport from the University to the city center:

Bus line 2 (Slavka Krautzeka I → Fiumara A)

Bus timetable: <https://www.autotrolej.hr/linije/gradske-linije/linija-2/>

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Program

Day 1, July 18, 2024

10:00-11:00	Jacob Stegenga (University of Cambridge): “Proportionality and Inductive Risk in the Fog of War” (room 401)	
	Coffee break	
	SESSION 1 (room 401)	SESSION 2 (room 402)
	Ethics and Society	Logic, Rationality, and Decision-Making
11:15-12:00	Filip Grgić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb): “Ignorance, Excuse, and Regret”	Zvonimir Šikić (Center for Logic and Decision Theory, University of Rijeka): “On Newcomb's problem”
	Coffee break	
12:15-13:00	Tomaž Grušovnik (University of Primorska): “Conceptual Analysis of Willful Ignorance”	Duško Dožudić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb): “Rethinking Frege’s “Wahrheitswerten” Strategy”
	Lunch	
14:30-15:15	Friderik Klampfer (University of Maribor): “Competence, Voluntariness and Authenticity in Psychiatric Euthanasia”	Nenad Smokrović (University of Rijeka): “Realism - Anti-realism Debate in the Light of the Fitch’s Argument”
	Coffee break	
15:30-16:15	Tomislav Bracanović (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb): “Autonomous Weapons Systems: Nothing New on the Ethical Front”	David Grčki (University of Rijeka): “Logic, Counterfactuals, and Imaginings”
	Coffee break	
16:30-17:15	Željko Ivanković (Prague City University): “Money and the Is-Ought Distinction”	Ante Debeljuh (University of Rijeka): “Knowledge and Belief in Distributed Systems”

Day 2, July 19, 2024

10:00-11:00	Jacob Stegenga (University of Cambridge): “Heart of Science” (room 401)	
	Coffee break	
	SESSION 1 (room 401)	SESSION 2 (room 402)
	Aesthetics, Art, and Experience	Philosophy of the Life Sciences
11:15-12:00	Iris Vidmar Jovanović (University of Rijeka): “The Scope of Art’s Moral Lessons”	Luca Malatesti (University of Rijeka): “Aims and Challenges in Explicating the Concept of Mental Disorder”
	Coffee break	
12:15-13:00	Ema Luna Lalić (University of Rijeka): “Fictional Worlds and Truth in Literature”	Vito Balorda & Tamara Crnko (University of Rijeka): “The Role of Philosophers in Rebuilding Trust in Science”
	Lunch	
14:30-15:15	Ksenija Savčić (University of Rijeka): “A Critical Analysis of Arriagada and Arriagada-Bruneau's Functionalist Approach and Evaluation Criteria: Exposing the Straw-Man”	Mladen Bošnjak (University of Rijeka): “Mental Causation, Free Will and Criminal Law”
	Coffee break	
15:30-16:15	Anna-Maria Dorić (University of Rijeka): “Perception Beyond Representationalism: Merleau-Ponty's Holistic Approach to Perceptual Experience”	Aleksandar Božić (University of Rijeka): “Nonhuman Interspecific Helping Behavior and Psychological Altruism”

List of Abstracts

Keynote Lectures

Jacob Stegenga (University of Cambridge, UK)

Thursday, July 18, 2024

Proportionality and Inductive Risk in the Fog of War

Violent acts in war are held to a principle of proportionality: the harms resulting from a violent act must be proportionate to the goods resulting from that act. Assessing proportionality can be seen as a problem of estimation which typically occurs under extreme epistemic constraints. I argue that proportionality estimates face a problem of inductive risk, which renders them deeply value-laden and permissive.

Friday, July 19, 2024

Heart of Science

The heart of science is justification. In this talk I describe the book I have just finished writing, which offers a philosophical view of science based on the centrality of justification. The aim of science goes far beyond justification—the aim of science is common knowledge, based on broadly shared and consensually justified scientific findings. Justificatory practices contribute to the achievement of common knowledge. But evaluative concepts for assessing various aspects of science—such as scientific progress, creditworthy science, or appropriate scientific testimony—should not be based on whether the scientific work under evaluation has achieved its aim. Rather, we should base those evaluative concepts on the extent to which the scientific work under evaluation has justified its claims. Our evaluation of science should, to use philosophical terms of art, be deontic rather than consequentialist. Good science need not attain its aims, it must justify its claims.

Contributed Papers

Vito Balorda & Tamara Crnko (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

The Role of Philosophers in Rebuilding Trust in Science

In this paper, we address the challenges surrounding the current crisis of knowledge, which is particularly evident in science. Numerous examples of conspiracies targeting scientific endeavors (e.g., climate change denial; chemtrails) are driven by the spread of misinformation, fostering unwarranted skepticism. We focus on a specific conspiracy related to the anti-vaccine movement. Although there is a scientific consensus advocating that vaccines are beneficial and a significant contributor to public health, the spread of misinformation undermines the achievements of vaccines. For instance, there is a resurgence of measles, particularly in Europe, despite the availability of a safe and effective vaccine that prevents the disease. Philosophers can play a crucial role in mitigating this crisis. Various scholars suggest potential roles for philosophers, such as providing reinformation, facilitating epistemic integration, and employing philosophical methodologies. We focus on one specific role, namely the improvement of the communication between scientists and laypeople, arguing that philosophers are adept at translating concepts across different domains and scientific disciplines. We contend that philosophers' skills in clarifying concepts and addressing differences in vocabulary can significantly enhance understanding and reduce miscommunication between scientists and laypeople. We aim to demonstrate this role in the case of the anti-vaccine movement. By bridging the gap between scientific knowledge and public perception, philosophers can help counteract misinformation and prevent the ongoing knowledge crisis. The role we advocate for underlines the importance of philosophers in connecting diverse bodies of knowledge and fostering a more informed public discourse.

Mladen Bošnjak (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Mental Causation, Free Will and Criminal Law

In the philosophy of criminal law, it is widely accepted that criminal responsibility is based on three assumptions: (1) there is free will, (2) folk-psychological entities such as beliefs, desires, and intentions really exist, and (3) these entities are causally efficient. However, these assumptions open up several philosophical problems. First, if mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires do not exist, then it makes no sense to ground criminal responsibility on folk psychology. Second, even if we accept that folk-psychological mental states exist and are causally efficient, it remains debatable whether the presupposition of mental causation is necessary for the ascription of criminal responsibility. Third, if there is no free will, then it is unjustified to ground criminal responsibility on such a presupposition. In this talk, I argue that criminal responsibility should not be based on the assumption of free will but rather on the assumption of reason-responsiveness. Furthermore, I provide arguments against eliminativism about folk psychology. I contend that mental states provide a rational-teleological explanation of the offender's behavior but do not cause it. Finally, I claim that an instrumentalist approach to folk psychology is a plausible philosophical position.

Aleksandar Božić (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Nonhuman Interspecific Helping Behavior and Psychological Altruism

The focus of the debate on altruism is on the altruistic behavior between members of the same biological species. The goal of this talk is to explore issues raised by the evidence of interspecific helping behavior (characterized as altruism) observed in nonhuman animals, specifically humpback whales (HW).

The study by Pitman et al. (2017) lists numerous instances of HWs interfering with the attacks of mammal-eating killer whales on their prey. The great majority of instances involved prey of non-HW species, and the actions of HWs sometimes allowed the prey to escape. The authors note that the instances of HWs interfering with the predation on members of other species demand an explanation beyond kin selection or reciprocity. They propose that one explanation could be the “spillover” of intraspecific behavioral patterns into the interspecific context (a concept due to Norris & Dohl 1980).

Kitcher (2011) argues that in addition to humans, chimpanzees are psychological altruists (PA) as well. He bases his argument on evidence gathered in the wild, where instances were recorded of chimpanzees displaying caregiving and helping behaviors toward other chimpanzees. The claim is that the character and context of the observed behaviors are such that the explanations of these behaviors invoking egoistic calculation are apparently less plausible than explanations that regard chimpanzees as PA.

Evidence suggests the following: humans are altruists towards other humans and other animals. Chimpanzees are altruists towards other chimpanzees. HWs are altruists towards other HWs and members of other species. Thus, it seems that there is a gap in interspecific altruism in the case of chimpanzees observed in nature (if we exclude the possible altruistic behavior of captive chimpanzees towards their human handlers).

In my talk, I will address the following issues:

(1) Interspecific altruism is arguably a more sophisticated trait than intraspecific altruism, particularly in PA.

(2) The argument that chimpanzees are PA should address the challenge of evidence for the interspecific altruism of HWs and the lack of evidence for the interspecific altruism of chimpanzees.

(3) HWs are evolutionary more distant from humans than chimpanzees are, but apparently display a more sophisticated kind of altruism.

(4) The authors claiming that chimpanzees are PA should address (1), (2), and (3) while challenged with the question of whether HWs are PA as well.

(5) If “spillover” is found to be the most plausible explanation for the interspecific altruism of HWs, the implications of this for the question of what animals can count as PA should be addressed.

References

Kitcher, P. (2011). *The Ethical Project*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Norris, K. S., and Dohl, T. P. (1980). The structure and function of cetacean schools. In L. M. Herman (ed), *Cetacean behavior: Mechanisms and functions*: 211-261. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Pitman, R. L. et al. (2017). Humpback whales interfering when mammal-eating killer whales attack other species: Mobbing behavior and interspecific altruism? *Marine Mammal Science*, 33 (1): 7-58.

Tomislav Bracanović (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia)

Autonomous Weapons Systems: Nothing New on the Ethical Front

A prominent topic within the ethics of artificial intelligence is the permissibility of autonomous weapons systems (AWS): artificial intelligence systems (such as drones and certain types of robots) that will be able, without human supervision, to make decisions on the application of lethal force. Although AWS, as far as the general public is aware, are not yet in use, they are a likely next step in the development of military technology that attracts a lot of criticism. The paper will discuss some of the most widespread ethical objections to AWS usually found in the literature, which, to a greater or lesser extent, rely either on *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello* branch of the just war theory. Specifically, the focus will be on the objection that AWS pose a unique threat to human dignity, the objection that their development increases the likelihood of armed conflicts, the objection that their application (if they become involved in war crimes) entails ethically and legally problematic responsibility gaps, and the objection that, when it comes to decisions to take another person's life, there is a unique value of human agency which should not be replaced by the artificial agency. Each objection will be analyzed and ranked in terms of its potential to constitute a knock-down argument against AWS. The paper aims to show that the conceptual inventory of most of the mentioned objections to AWS can be coherently used in the opposite way (in favor of their ethical desirability) and that AWS, compared to other weapons already available, do not generate any new ethical challenges.

Ante Debeljuh (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Knowledge and Belief in Distributed Systems

Epistemic and doxastic logics were developed as a way of talking about knowledge and belief attribution in the most abstract of settings. Hintikka's endeavour (1963) resulted in this domain-specific formalism reflecting the behaviour of epistemic and doxastic notions within its theoretical framework. The basis for this development was modal logic with intensional semantics, which allowed the theorists to construct the notions of knowledge and belief through relational structures. The theorists' attempts of calibrating the formalism to fit the epistemic theory and vice versa resulted in what we now know as epistemic modelling.

The attempts of constructing a non-linguistic model were inspired by computer sciences and developed into proper epistemic models that avoided many of the problems that the language-based models encountered. Stalnaker wrote a paper entitled *On the Logics of Knowledge and Belief*, in which he discusses non-linguistic attempts of model building. The specific framework for modelling that I intend to discuss in my talk is called Distributed Systems Modelling (DSM), which adapts the way of talking about interconnected processors within a computer network into an externalist epistemic model.

I intend to show how we can adapt the language that epistemic logics use to talk about knowledge and belief to the DSM jargon in order to show how this way of conceptualizing epistemic situations can be a useful theoretical instrument. Furthermore, I intend to talk about the interrelationship between knowledge and belief within such structures as DSMs, as not all logics used in epistemic modelling are capable of defining them discretely. I intend to skim through some formalisms such as S4, S4.2, and S5 in order to show how this interrelationship can be defined.

Anna-Maria Dorić (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Perception Beyond Representationalism: Merleau-Ponty's Holistic Approach to Perceptual Experience

One of the main debates in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience. Representationalism is probably the most dominant view in this debate. It posits that perceptual states are internal representations of the external world. Moreover, it claims that perceptual states represent the world as being a certain way. Such a view easily accounts for the existence of discrepancies between the representation of an object and the actual object. This is an important feature of a good theory of perception because it is indisputable that we sometimes do perceive things incorrectly. However, representationalism often abstracts perception from the phenomenal experience people have while perceiving the world and reduces it to a kind of computational process. Therefore, my aim is to shift the focus back to the phenomenal experience by offering Merleau-Ponty's view of perception as an embodied, active engagement with the world. His concept of the “intentional arc” offers an interesting framework that integrates past experiences, actual context, and future anticipations through a dynamic dialogue between the lived body and the outer world. This approach recognizes the fluid and dynamic nature of perception, emphasizing how our bodily actions and interactions shape our perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty's holistic approach offers a richer, nuanced understanding of perceptual experience, one that cannot be adequately captured by a representational account of perception, because it emphasizes the inseparable intertwining of bodily engagement, lived experience, and the contextual nuances of perception that transcend mere cognitive representations. By foregrounding the embodied nature of perception, I will argue that this perspective offers a more comprehensive account of our engagement with and interpretation of the world than representationalism does.

Dušan Dožudić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia)

Rethinking Frege's "Wahrheitswerten" Strategy

An attentive reader of Frege's "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" must be struck by his decision to disregard states of affairs (complexes consisting of objects, properties, and relations) as truthmakers of true thoughts and 'Bedeutungen' of sentences that express them, and to propose instead that thoughts are true because, in one way or another, they present the same object – the True (false thoughts, the False). But what happened with states of affairs, the entities we typically take to be the target of our declarative sentences and thoughts such sentences express? If sentences and thoughts (sometimes) concern states of affairs, and if these sentences and thoughts are true whenever states of affairs obtain, would it not be natural to identify precisely such entities with truthmakers of thoughts? Many philosophers before Frege and after him, too, thought precisely that. Frege thought that reasons to believe otherwise are overwhelming and proposed instead to assign the role of states of affairs to truth values (Wahrheitswerten). What reasons Frege might have had for this? In my presentation, I will explain and re-examine Frege's curious move, and analyse the arguments he offered to support it. I will identify crucial places in Frege's writing where he attacks states of affairs (and closely related entities) and show that the same pattern of argumentation occurs in each of the places, starting with the 1884 criticism of Mill in Grundlagen up to the criticism of the manuscript of Wittgenstein's Tractatus in 1919.

David Grčki (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Logic, Counterfactuals, and Imaginings

In this paper, I argue that imaginings differ from visualizations (and other sensory-based mental states) with respect to counterfactual reasoning and that this difference carries relevant epistemic consequences. Counterfactual reasoning is a mental capacity that takes the following form; if it has been the case that ϕ , then it would have been the case that ψ , where ϕ and ψ are variables ranging over any sentences of a formal language. Imagining is a mental capacity that takes the following form: $\exists \phi(x)$, where x is a formula of a singular proposition about a particular object, even if the individual constant fails to denote (Williamson, 2016). In the first part, I present counterfactual reasoning with a focus on rationality, agency, and action (Byrne, 2005). In the second part, I present imaginings with a relationship to knowledge (Williamson, 1997; Dokic, 2008). I claim that different imaginings—epistemic, sensory, and subjective may lead, under the right conditions, to different types of knowledge – knowledge *that*, knowledge *how* (Ryle, 1949), and knowledge *about* (Walsh, 1969), respectively. In the third part, I argue that the concept of imagining is conflated with the concept of visualization in contemporary literature that engages with imagination and knowledge. By relying on Williamson (2016) and Dokic (2008), I claim that there is a difference between imaginings and visualizations with respect to propositional and sensory content. These conflation prevent us from acknowledging ways in which imagination might lead to knowledge. Following Priest (2005), I clarify the difference with an example of logically impossible objects, such as a round square. The latter can be imagined but not visualized.

Filip Grgić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia)

Ignorance, Excuse, and Regret

In my talk, I will discuss the issue of when an agent can legitimately appeal to ignorance as an excuse for her action. Taking a broadly Aristotelian perspective, I will argue for three theses. First, I will argue for the parity between factual and moral ignorance: if we want to understand whether ignorance can serve as an excuse, we must use the same type of argumentation for both factual and moral ignorance. Second, I will argue that, by itself, neither factual nor moral ignorance can serve as an excuse. Third, my idea is that ignorance can be an excuse only as part of a set of conditions for a legitimate excuse, which, besides ignorance, includes the mental state of the agent (which is revealed by her subsequent reaction to what she has done, such as regret) and the appropriate response from observers.

Tomaž Grušovnik (University of Primorska, Slovenia)

Conceptual Analysis of Willful Ignorance

Willful ignorance (WI) is one of the most important obstacles to moral development, related to the so-called “epistemic condition of moral responsibility”. However, the nature of the epistemic phenomenon seems to be quite complex. One of the most problematic issues related to WI is the question of culpability: when can the epistemic and/or moral agent be held responsible and accountable for their intentional avoidance of knowledge? It seems that one of the crucial roles here is played by three elements: 1) how difficult or dangerous it is for an individual to obtain knowledge; 2) how strong was the suspicion of the intentionally ignored proposition *p*; 3) what was the quality of their will. The talk will focus on the first two elements. For example, if obtaining knowledge is exorbitantly demanding or dangerous, so that a person risks their life in trying to establish the truth of *p*, then it seems that a person cannot reasonably be blamed for not knowing *p*. One consequence of this is that the socio-political context seems to matter a great deal, since WI seems to be more blameworthy in liberal and democratic societies than in strict totalitarian regimes. Things seem to be less clear when it comes to the strength of suspicion element: here it does not seem straightforward that someone who is more suspicious of *p* is *eo ipso* also more guilty than someone who perhaps just categorically avoids the possibility of coming into contact with *p*. The talk will also explore the problem of WI without suspicion, or the problem of what exactly a person who categorically refuses contact with knowledge (the “just leave me alone” or “hut up, I don't want to hear any of this” individual) can be accused of being willfully ignorant of.

Željko Ivanković (Prague City University, Czech Republic)

Money and the Is-Ought Distinction

The is-ought distinction is considered to be a central problem in moral philosophy. The distinction has been thoroughly discussed and often strongly criticised. Nevertheless, it has been very influential. In some sense it is analogous to other important opposites like the distinction between descriptive and evaluative approach, between positive and normative, and between neutral and prescriptive. The distinction places morality and moral theory into the age dominated by positive knowledge and modern science. 'What is' -that is objective, while 'what ought to be done' is subjective and arbitrary. Instead of another abstract discussion, the paper applies the distinction to money. The question is what we can learn about the is-ought distinction from an analysis of the concept of money. And vice versa, what we can find out if we apply the is-ought distinction to money. From its very beginning money was understood as a value neutral tool: means of payment, medium of exchange, unit of account—'simply' a measure, etc. On the other hand, money was demonised. Aristotle condemned the abuse of money. The case under consideration is cryptocurrencies. They are compared to two other technologies of money: commodity money and bank money. Technology is also considered value neutral. Nevertheless, it seems that there are intrinsic and different values in three money technologies. One can choose any of them for a good or bad cause but cannot avoid choosing values attached to them: trust, anonymity, duty and responsibility. Therefore, a description what is particular money technology is not complete without consideration of what it should be. Positive knowledge about money technology includes evaluation. This is probably the same with all techno-systems. Money technology is not value neutral; 'is' and 'ought' are not separate but intertwined. Contrary to Hume's influential conclusion the two are not governed by distinct reasoning. Their real relationship is to be investigated.

Friderik Klampfer (University of Maribor, Slovenia)

Competence, Voluntariness and Authenticity in Psychiatric Euthanasia

The aim of the paper is to morally evaluate psychiatric euthanasia, i.e. euthanasia of patients where the sole underlying cause of their unbearable suffering is an incurable mental disease or disorder. Psychiatric euthanasia, as currently practiced in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, has not just caused worldwide moral outrage. It is also regularly advanced as a crucial piece of evidence for the claim that legalizing active voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill patients will sooner or later land us on a slippery slope towards far more reprehensible forms of euthanasia.

In the paper, I assess the soundness of one particularly popular argument against psychiatric euthanasia. According to this argument, very few psychiatric conditions, if any, meet the following three conditions: they a) are incurable, b) cause patients unbearable suffering, and c) leave their capacity for rational and/or autonomous agency intact. More precisely, my target is the view that what renders psychiatric euthanasia morally impermissible, in principle, is the fact that mental disorders, by their very nature, deprive psychiatric patients of their capacity for judgment, decision-making, rational control, and other constituents of rational agency.

In contrast to this, I show that there is ample room for psychiatric patients with most common diagnoses, from clinical depression and borderline personality disorder to dementia, to make a choice of death over life that is at once competent, voluntary and authentic, and that in light of this, an outright ban on psychiatric euthanasia is difficult, if not impossible, to justify.

Ema Luna Lalić (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Fictional Worlds and Truth in Literature

In this paper, I discuss the concept of fictional worlds and its implications for philosophy of literature, particularly with respect to determining the truth in literature. Expressions such as 'storyworld' and 'fictional universe' are commonly used by readers of literary fiction and philosophers of literature alike to discuss literary narratives. More specifically, the concept has been used to determine the scope of truth in fiction and the nature of inferences readers are justified to make from the work of fiction. David Lewis offers a modal interpretation of fictional worlds in which works of fiction generate possible worlds. However, conceptualizing fictional worlds as possible worlds is faced by two difficulties: the problem of contradictory propositions in works of fiction and the incompleteness or indeterminacy of fictional worlds. The contradictory propositions create a logically impossible world, while the incompleteness begs the question of determining the truth value of many propositions. In light of these two difficulties and the perceived counterintuitive implications that they elicit, some philosophers (Kendall Walton, Stacie Friend) have proposed a functionalist approach to fictional worlds that views truth in fiction in relation to prescriptions to imagine the content as being true. In line with their approach, I argue that characterizing fictional worlds as Lewis's possible worlds is not ideally suited to explain the nature of our engagement with fiction or to deal with the issue of contradictory statements and indeterminacy in fiction.

Luca Malatesti (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Aims and Challenges in Explicating the Concept of Mental Disorder

To make progress on the current and longstanding debate on the concept of mental disorder, we need to adjudicate the aims of this debate and the methods to achieve them. I propose a methodological framework for prescribing an explication of the concept of mental disorder.

Within this framework, I first defend a series of theoretical and practical aims that the concept of mental disorder should help us achieve. Based on these aims, I argue that the concept of mental disorder should involve other notions that, in turn, need to be explicated. Specifically, I maintain that a mental disorder should be analysed as (1) a unitary condition across the individuals who have it, (2) harmful, (3) involving incapacities (or limited capacities) to align (4) with properly justified standards. A further important desideratum is that (5) the concept of mental disorder should cohere with a satisfactory account of what makes a mental disorder "mental."

Although I do not offer the ultimate analyses of the relevant concepts that enter conditions (1) - (5), I consider the specific challenges that need to be met to provide them.

Ksenija Savčić (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

A Critical Analysis of Arriagada and Arriagada-Bruneau's Functionalist Approach and Evaluation Criteria: Exposing the Straw-Man

In my presentation, I will expose the straw-man in Arriagada and Arriagada-Bruneau article "AI's Role in Creative Processes: A Functionalist Approach" (2022). The authors argue for a functionalist approach in understanding creativity and suggest that we should evaluate AI generated art by testing audience's responses. They claim that Margaret Boden's account of creativity supports their proposal. I will demonstrate that Boden's discussion cannot support neither functionalist approach proposed by the authors, nor their evaluation criteria. My discussion will be divided into two parts.

1. I will address the A&AB's functionalist approach in understanding creativity. The authors argue for extending the notion of creativity to machines and inanimate objects (such as nature). They claim that the breadth of Boden's account of creativity is supportive of their functionalist account. I will dispute that claim by showing that the breadth of Boden's definition refers to the variety of conceptual spaces in which creativity can manifest itself, not to the variety of agents. Boden's definition of creativity is restricted to humans; therefore, it is incompatible with A&AB's functionalist approach.
2. I will dispute the authors' claim that the evaluation criteria as they propose it can be supported with Boden's account of value. I will show that Boden's account of value is tightly connected with her discussion of conceptual spaces - such as mathematics, geometry, chess, classical Western music etc. It is only through unjustifiable exception of art from other conceptual spaces that the authors are able to claim that whatever looks creative to people must by definition be considered creative. I will demonstrate that the proposed by A&AB's evaluation criteria fails when applied to other conceptual spaces due to recognition problem.

Nenad Smokrović (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

Realism - Anti-realism Debate in the Light of the Fitch's Argument

The paper considers the aspect of the so-called Fitch's argument that seriously challenges the verificationist theory. Throughout the paper I'm pursuing the idea that most of the attempts that intend to vindicate verificationism from the grip of Fitch's argument, including Edgington's theory, do not succeed in their intention. Concerning the attempts to mitigate the effect of Fitch's argument to verificationism in the framework of classical logic (Edgington as the most important representative), I am taking side with their critics (Williamson, Percival) and claim that they fail in their intention. Regarding the attempts to block the effect of Fitch's argument in the framework of non-classical (intuitionistic, relevant, dialetheist, and so on) logics, they do it by introducing principles that invalidate some of the basic classical rules and principles, usually introducing trivial worlds. In that case, the verificationist principle (as well as all inferences included in Fitch's argument) is vacuously valid, which seems to be unsatisfactory. In any case, there is no decisive evidence that either classical or any of the non-classical approaches can avail the verificationists nothing to escape out of the grip of FA.

Zvonimir Šikić (Center for Logic and Decision Theory, University of Rijeka, Croatia)

On Newcomb's problem

I explain why the two boxes argument is the solution to Newcomb's problem. Many are confused by the fact that it is more profitable to be irrational than to be rational. But there are many games where it is more profitable to be irrational. How comes that there are rational one-boxers? I offer a qualitative and a quantitative explanation. Finally, I prove that Newcomb's problem is not a version of Prisoner's dilemma, as sometimes asserted.

Iris Vidmar Jovanović (University of Rijeka, Croatia)

The Scope of Art's Moral Lessons

In discussing the capacity of screen stories to impact our moral sensibility and help us achieve moral understanding, Ted Nannicelli criticizes Noel Carroll's interpretation of Jonathan Demme's 1993 film *Philadelphia*. On Carroll's view, *Philadelphia* successfully calibrates spectators' moral emotions in a way which makes them more sympathetic toward gay people and more open to recognizing their humanity, given the importance of family relations as depicted in the film. Nannicelli however criticizes this, by arguing that the film, and Carroll, rely on the wrong moral assumptions: gay people do not deserve moral respect on the account of being or having loving family members, but on the account of being human beings. However, argues Nannicelli, "this is not something that the film, on Carroll's account of it, at least, is designed to help audience understand" (2023, 21). My aim in this paper is to analyze the plausibility of Nannicelli's criticism: I argue that Nannicelli's criticism is justified but that it does not show that the moral lessons identified by Carroll are not valuable. I take this discussion as a springboard from which I explore the scope of moral lessons we expect morally valuable works of art to generate.

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